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ABSTRACT 
The Industrial Networks Theory (cf. Axelsson and Easton, 1992, Hakansson and Snehota, 
1995) sets out to describe and explain the business relationships and markets in which the 
focal firm is deeply embedded. One of its major propositions pertains to the (time-varying) 
significance of business relationships for the focal firm (Gadde et al., 2003), i.e., business 
relationships influence to some extent the focal firm’s survival. Such significance seems 
strongly related to the role played by business relationships and consequently the relationship 
outcomes accruing to the focal firm. The theoretical justification underlying this proposition 
is outwardly oriented, somewhat overlooking the inside of the focal firm - in particular the 
influence of business relationships on what the focal firm does competently within and across 
its boundaries. Arguably, the creation and appropriation of relationship value by the focal 
firm is a necessary but not sufficient condition for relationship significance. A supplementary 
(internal) explanation supported by Knowledge-based Theories of the Firm (e.g., see Kogut 
and Zander, 1992), we suggest, may be missing. Our aim here has been to intuitively pinpoint 
a theoretical flaw, further suggesting a feasible path for its solution. 
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“(…) significant, behind the eyes 
there’s no need to hide (…) 
significance, between the lines 
(we may need to hide) (…)” 
Pearl Jam, “I am mine” in Riot Act (2002), EPIC 
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INTRODUCTION 
Theories are, to varying degrees, conceptual frameworks for understanding, allowing us to 
make sense of the overwhelming world which we inhabit (Astley, 1985). Conceptually, 
theories may be depicted as systems of constructs and variables, linked by propositions and 
hypotheses respectively, and bounded by the spatial and temporal assumptions of theorists (cf. 
Bacharach, 1989). With regard to the Industrial Networks’ (or Markets-as-Networks’) body of 
knowledge, it has been developed by the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group 
over the last three decades - some seminal contributions from the 1970s can be readily 
identified (e.g., Blois, 1972, Hakansson and Ostberg, 1975, Richardson, 1972, amongst 
others). We believe that such thirty-year-old body of knowledge can be seen as a theoretical 
system of constructs and variables (e.g., actor, adaptation, micro-position, just to name a few), 
with which some propositions and hypotheses are derived (e.g., the existence, connectedness, 
and uniqueness of business relationships in industrial markets), bounded by theorists’ spatial 
assumptions (e.g., business relationship as the main unit of analysis).
1 According to 
Bacharach’s (1989) definition of theory, the Industrial Networks’ body of knowledge can be 
deliberately referred to as a theory. The recognition of a fully-fledged Theory of Industrial 
Networks, even if sometimes denied or not assumed (Hakansson and Snehota, 2000), should 
not even be seen as a new (or absurd) argument within the IMP Group as it seems to be 
shared, albeit implicitly, by some of its scholars (see, e.g., Moller and Halinen, 1999, 
McLoughlin and Horan, 2002). 
Still evolving, the Industrial Networks Theory (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Axelsson and 
Easton, 1992) attempts to describe and explain the inner workings of business markets (and 
the business relationships among firms, these comprise). At least five major propositions may 
be pointed out in the Industrial Networks Theory: (1) the existence of business relationships 
(Hakansson, 1982, Ford, 1980), as well as their connectedness (Axelsson and Easton, 1992, 
Anderson et al., 1994) and uniqueness (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Ford et al., 1998); (2) 
business relationships as a third type of governance structure, alternative to hierarchies and 
markets (Richardson, 1972, Hakansson and Johanson, 1993b); (3) the development of 
knowledge in business relationships, i.e., among firms (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, Ford et 
al., 1986, Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995); (4) firm performance explained 
                                                 
1 Industrial Networks Theory does not seem to be only properly applied over certain time periods – hence it does not make 
sense to include temporal restrictions in its empirical applicability. Notwithstanding, as there is always uncertainty regarding 
the applicability of theories in the future (Bacharach, 1989), Industrial Networks Theory is (like all others) partly bounded in 
time.   4
both by internal operations and exchange processes (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, 
Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Araujo and Easton, 1996); and (5) the significance of business 
relationships for the focal firm (Gadde et al., 2003).
2 Here we will be primarily concerned 
with the last of these propositions. 
The significance proposition is made quite explicit in the pervasive contention throughout 
Industrial Networks Theory that business relationships are one of the most important 
resources at the disposal of the focal firm (cf. Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Hakansson, 
1987, Hakansson, 1989). The business relationships that the focal firm establishes, develops, 
and maintains with counterparts (e.g., customers, suppliers, competitors, third parties) are 
significant because they affect the focal firm’s functioning and development, ultimately 
influencing its survival in business markets (Ford and McDowell, 1999, Kalwani and 
Narayandas, 1995, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Without business relationships, the focal 
firm is not only somehow impeded to operate and grow, but more importantly it is doomed to 
perish. Contrary to what the economic theory postulates, the existence of the focal firm cannot 
be conceived of without business relationships – no existing (surviving) firm is ‘an island in a 
sea of market relations’ (Richardson, 1972, Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). As a result, some 
scholars and researchers stress the ‘strategic importance’ or ‘significance’ of business 
relationships (Hakansson, 1989, Gadde et al., 2003), whereas others refer to relationships of 
‘strategic status’ (Moller and Halinen, 1999) and to ‘critical’, ‘crucial’, ‘good’, ‘high 
quality’, ‘high-performing’, ‘important’, ‘relevant’, ‘significant’, or ‘valuable’ business 
relationships (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Cunningham, 1980, Ford et al., 1998, 
Kutschker, 1982, Hakansson, 1987, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987, Gadde and Snehota, 2000, 
Ford and McDowell, 1999). Even Edith Penrose, whose influence is conspicuously 
recognized across Industrial Networks Theory, has earlier remarked “[t]he importance 
attached by firms to the maintenance of their existing business relationships (…)” (1959, p. 
147, fn. 2).
3 
By and large, business relationships are significant for the focal firm. Nevertheless, not all 
business relationships of the focal firm are equally significant (i.e., do not affect to the same 
extent the focal firm’s survival) – obviously some are more significant to it than others (Ford 
                                                 
2 In tracing the ‘IMP Story’, Hakansson and Snehota (2000) review the first three of these propositions though labelling them 
differently as ‘conceptual cornerstones’. 
3 The term ‘relationship significance’ may be thus equated to ‘relationship relevance’, ‘relationship importance’, or 
‘relationship value’. It is here used to denote the irreplaceable contribution of business relationships to the focal firm’s 
survival, which is implicitly assumed throughout Industrial Networks Theory. Such contribution, as we will see later on, is 
brought about because relationship benefits are perceived to exceed accruing sacrifices, i.e., relationship value is created and 
captured by the focal firm.   5
and McDowell, 1999). And relationship significance is but a perception of the focal firm (and 
of its counterparts), particularly of their members. Therefore, it is bound to vary over time 
within and between the parties involved. But what is the underlying explanation for 
relationship significance? And is such justification sufficient? 
Surprisingly, the significance of business relationships for the focal firm has not been object 
of systematic analysis. Tacitly shared by scholars and researchers, relationship significance is 
a taken-for-granted (apparently primordial) presumption, often asserted but not much 
discussed within Industrial Networks Theory. Supposedly, such significance is strongly 
associated with the role business relationships accomplish for the focal firm. By fulfilling a 
role (in the form of functions and dysfunctions), more benefits than sacrifices – hence 
relationship value – normally ensue to the focal firm. (Relationship benefits and sacrifices, as 
well as the functions and dysfunctions from which they originate, are examined at length in 
the third section.) 
The explanation, within Industrial Networks Theory, supporting relationship significance is 
naturally oriented towards the focal firm’s outside, in particular its context (i.e., a full-faced 
environment composed of a limited number of distinct, clearly identifiable counterparts) 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). An all-encompassing argument - the creation and 
appropriation of relationship value by the focal firm - is advanced to support the significance 
proposition. This argument, we advocate, seems a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
justifying relationship significance; another (internally-focused) theoretical explanation may 
be missing here. Such justification ought to derive from other theories, particularly those 
addressing the core (inside) of the focal firm. The so-called Competence- or Knowledge-based 
Theories of the Firm (Penrose, 1959, Kogut and Zander, 1992, Foss, 1996) may be, in this 
respect, quite apposite. According to these theories, the focal firm is seen as a bundle of direct 
and indirect competences, which allow it to (know how to) do certain things by itself, as well 
as (know how to) get other things done by others respectively (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
Loasby, 1998). What the focal firm gets done by others is a direct reflection of the business 
relationships (and also the arm’s-length relations) it is able and chooses to initiate, develop, 
and sustain with several counterparts. Moreover, what the focal firm does (both within and 
across its fuzzy boundaries) is largely a consequence of the business (and purely 
transactional) relationships that it is unable or, if capable, decides not to engage in. In this 
sense, we suggest that it may be enlightening to append a knowledge-based reasoning on the 
aforementioned proposition.   6
Admittedly, a flaw is being spotted in Industrial Networks Theory. Our claim is not absolutely 
solve such theoretical pitfall, yet seek to offer insights on how one might attempt it. We agree 
with the overall whats and hows of Industrial Networks Theory (i.e., its constructs and 
propositions, respectively), but not completely with its whys (in particular, the logical 
reasoning underlying its relationship significance proposition).
4 Therefore we challenge the 
robustness  of the significance proposition or, in other words, the completeness of its 
underlying arguments. It seems that the phenomenon in question - relationship significance - 
can only be partly explained in terms of the existing theory (Wilkinson, 2003). Our intent is 
neither to question nor to evaluate the Industrial Networks Theory as a whole. We are rather 
trying to contribute to it. The issue here is not which of the focal firm’s business relationships 
are (more or less) significant, nor even why they are so – although we admit the following 
discussion may help to do this (see the next section). The gist of our rationale is that the 
arguments within Industrial Networks Theory justifying the relationship significance do not 
seem to suffice. 
This paper is organized as follows. We start in the next section by addressing the needfulness 
of enquiring this topic. The theoretical support for the relationship significance proposition is 
then discussed in detail. The fourth section comprises the motives conducive to challenging 
the robustness of the proposition. Finally, some issues related to the future empirical research 
(indispensable to extend the network-based rationale on relationship significance) are 
outlined. 
RELATIONSHIP SIGNIFICANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Business relationships are sources of both opportunities and constraints, thus being 
simultaneously demanding and rewarding for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995).
5 
There are multiple relationship benefits accruing to the focal firm but these do not come 
rapidly or for free (Blois, 1999). Inescapably, some sacrifices must be incurred. Being 
involved in business relationships is always resource-intensive, even if to varying extents 
(Gadde and Snehota, 2000). Relationship benefits and sacrifices are both unavoidable (Walter 
                                                 
4 Whetten (1989) describes theory as a collection of four essential elements: (i) what factors (constructs and variables) should 
be part of the explanation on the phenomenon of interest; (ii) how are those factors related (i.e., which propositions and 
hypotheses may be formulated); (iii) why were such factors chosen and the linkages among them proposed; and (iv) who, 
where and when (i.e., under which spatial and temporal conditions the theory holds). Together the whats, hows, and whys 
constitute the subject of theory, whilst the whos, wheres, and whens determine its range of applicability. Whetten further 
contends that why is probably the most important of all four elements, insofar as it is both the theoretical glue that welds a 
theory together and the basis for judging theory’s soundness. 
5 Needless to say, this also applies to the counterparts with which the focal firm maintains business relationships. Because we 
are here only focused on the focal firm, the counterparts’ perspective is primarily left latent (albeit totally resembling the 
former’s).   7
et al., 2001, Walter et al., 2003). Ensuing benefits are often sensed to outweigh sacrifices and 
relationship value is thus created and appropriated by the focal firm (Wilson and Jantrania, 
1994) – in such cases, business relationships are perceived as being (more or less) significant. 
However, if sacrifices exceed (or are roughly equal to) benefits, business relationships may be 
deemed insignificant for the focal firm. 
The focal firm needs to continually prioritize its business relationships (Gadde et al., 2003), 
since they (i) differ over time in their relative degree of significance and (ii) can only be 
established, nurtured, maintained, and even ended through large and incremental investment 
of resources (adaptation) (Hakansson, 1982). As business relationships are not equally 
significant at a given point in time, and the focal firm is endowed with limited resources (and 
consequently, it can be highly involved with only a limited number of counterparts), a mixed 
relationship posture must be effected (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). In this respect, adopting 
both low- and high-involvement relationship postures (hence committing resources to lesser 
and greater extents respectively) seems the best way for the focal firm to ‘make the most’ of 
its business relationships. 
Business relationships, according to their perceived significance for the focal firm, should be 
handled in quite different ways – relationship differentiation is demanded (Ford et al., 1998). 
Typically the focal firm is strongly committed to (i.e., highly involved in) business 
relationships it perceives as being (currently or in the future) highly significant. Such 
relationships are sure to have taken a long time and many efforts to develop and, consequently 
may be extremely difficult to replace (Ford et al., 1998). Even if substitutable relationships 
(actual or potential) do exist, these are probably not significant to the same extent (e.g., 
because their benefits are perceived as comparatively lower or sacrifices greater). A low-
involvement posture, on the contrary, is likely to be adopted by the focal firm in the business 
relationships perceived as low in significance. 
Notoriously, the significance of business relationships must be continually assessed if the 
focal firm aims to manage effectively and efficiently (the allocation of resources within) its 
set of business relationships. Differentiation with regard to relationship posture – essentially 
network management (Ritter et al., 2004) - can only be achieved as long as the focal firm 
clearly understands which of its business relationships are significant, to what degree, and 
more importantly why. Only by enquiring relationship significance and unfolding its 
determinants, will the indispensable understanding - concerning the (individual and 
collective) management of business relationships - emerge. That understanding will lead, for   8
instance, the focal firm to reinvest in a business relationship (expected to become even more 
significant in a near future) or instead divest (if it is perceived as being currently 
insignificant). The decision to divest of (or even terminate) a business relationship will 
probably release resources that the focal firm may use otherwise (e.g., to deepen another 
extant, or establish a new, business relationship potentially more significant). Substantial 
opportunity costs may be incurred if the focal firm chooses to maintain a (poorly significant) 
business relationship in disfavour of other (highly significant) one(s). 
Our main intent in this paper is to contribute to Industrial Networks Theory, especially its 
explanations for relationship significance, and indirectly to better practice. Since to improve 
the practice of industrial marketing and purchasing, it is needed first of all a better 
understanding of business firms, relationships, and markets (Wilkinson, 2001). Wilkinson and 
Young (2002, p. 127) note that “(…) by extending and improving firms’ understanding and 
sensitivity regarding relationship and network issues, better performing firms and networks 
will emerge (…)”. The dominant stance within Industrial Networks Theory – that better 
theory leads to better practice - largely justifies its positive orientation (Easton, 1995). This is 
not tantamount to say that Industrial Networks Theory is purely descriptive or ‘managerially 
empty’ (cf. Moller and Halinen, 1999). As Easton (1992) argues, normative implications flow 
from, but do not drive, it. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE PROPOSITION AND ITS UNDERLYING ARGUMENTS 
Any attempt to justify the significance of business relationships for the focal firm should not 
bypass the centrality of their role in Industrial Networks Theory. Business relationships may 
be considered significant owing to their multiple purposes (and associated outcomes) for the 
focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Gadde and Snehota, 2000). 
The focal firm engages in business relationships fundamentally because of appropriate payoff 
structures (Axelrod, 1984). The payoff for cooperating exceeds that of deflecting (i.e., 
abandon current cooperation with a specific partner and proceed alone). In other words, the 
(economic and non-economic) consequences resulting from being engaged in business 
relationships are deemed globally satisfactory by the focal firm.
6 It pays off for the focal firm 
to be involved in a business relationship with a specific counterpart (Kalwani and 
                                                 
6 This, of course, holds true if rationality in business behaviour is assumed. Demsetz (1992) further suggests that business 
behaviour cannot be properly understood in the absence of that presumption. The rationality of business firms, even if 
bounded (cf. Thompson, 1967), seems one of the stepping stones for Industrial Networks Theory. Hakansson and Snehota 
(1995, chapter 8, fn. 1) highlight this.   9
Narayandas, 1995), and consequently that business relationship is termed significant, for 
either or both of two reasons: 
(1) relationship benefits (i.e., the ensuing positive outcomes) obtained by the focal firm 
exceed, to some extent, the sacrifices incurred (i.e., relationship costs plus deleterious 
outcomes) (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Biong et al., 1997, Hakansson and Snehota, 
1995, Blois, 1999); 
(2) relationship benefits are greater and/or relationship sacrifices are lower than benefits 
and sacrifices (a) expected by the focal firm or (b) potentially stemming from 
alternatives, i.e., substitutable business relationships and conventional governance 
structures (hierarchies and markets) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Anderson et al., 
1994, Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
An opening distinction between benefits and sacrifices ensuing from business relationships is 
timely here. Relationship benefits are positive outcomes (Anderson et al., 1994) accruing to 
the focal firm from the fulfilment of relationship functions (Walter et al., 2001, Walter et al., 
2003). Relationship sacrifices, on the other hand, encompass both the costs incurred by the 
focal firm (to obtain the positive outcomes referred) (Gadde and Snehota, 2000) and the 
deleterious outcomes that ensue from being involved in business relationships (Anderson et 
al., 1994). Deleterious outcomes frequently result from relationship dysfunctions (Walter et 
al., 2001). If deleterious outcomes accrue to the focal firm then a relationship dysfunction 
must have occurred; yet, we would argue, deleterious outcomes can also result from the non-
fulfilment of some relationship functions (expected or desired by the focal firm). In this 
regard, deleterious relationship outcomes include not only ensuing harmful consequences, but 
also the potential (but not attained) positive outcomes. In sum, one may argue that 
relationship benefits comprise ‘what is positively get’ from a business relationship (i.e., its 
positive outcomes), whereas sacrifices consist of ‘what is given’ (i.e., its costs) plus ‘what is 
negatively get’ or ‘what could have been positively get’ from that same relationship (i.e., its 
deleterious outcomes). Ford et al. (1998) put it in different terms, seeing relationship benefits 
and sacrifices respectively as what parties (focal firm and its counterpart) demand from, and 
can offer to, each other. 
The justification advanced within Industrial Networks Theory for relationship significance - 
business relationships pay off (per se or comparatively) - may be thus divided in two. Let us 
now examine each of them in detail, explaining why the latter is here intendedly left apart.   10
Relationship benefits outweigh sacrifices: the minimal explanation 
By engaging in a business relationship with a counterpart, the focal firm obtains benefits in 
excess of sustained sacrifices. In this sense, functions fulfilled by business relationships 
outweigh either the dysfunctions carried out or the functions not accomplished by them, or 
both (Walter et al., 2001). As benefits more than offset sacrifices, relationship value is 
(jointly) produced and (partly) appropriated by the focal firm (Ravald and Gronroos, 1996).
7 
When this happens, the business relationship is labelled valuable (Ford and McDowell, 1999) 
or high-performing (Gadde and Snehota, 2000); in our terminology, it is entitled significant 
for the focal firm. Otherwise, if relationship sacrifices were greater than benefits, then no 
relationship value would exist – the business relationship would not be seen as significant or 
valuable, but instead as a burden or liability for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, 
Ford et al., 1998, Hakansson and Snehota, 1998). 
Relationship benefits and sacrifices are respectively greater and/or lower than the 
potential ones in expectations or alternatives: the differential justification 
It may not suffice to argue that business relationships bring about more benefits than 
sacrifices (thus creating relationship value) – the focal firm may still want to take into account 
the value created in substitutable business relationships and in alternative governance 
structures. In this regard, the value co-created and appropriated by the focal firm in a business 
relationship should exceed the value it expected or the potential value ensuing from 
alternatives. The benefits accruing from a business relationship are greater and/or sacrifices 
are lower when compared to those that the focal firm: (a) expected to attain (taking into 
consideration its past experience in similar relationships); or (b) could seize alone or with 
others, that is, in hierarchies and markets or in substitutable business relationships with other 
counterparts (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Zajac and Olsen, 1993, Anderson et al., 1994, 
Biong et al., 1997, Walter and Ritter, 2003, Wilson and Jantrania, 1994, Kalwani and 
Narayandas, 1995). 
                                                 
7 We take here a superficial account on relationship value. How relationship value is co-produced and afterward distributed 
within the business network (i.e., which are the antecedents for relationship value creation and the determinants for value 
sharing), as well as how it can be measured (i.e., what are its multiple, perceived or observable, components) remain objects 
of heated dissension among researchers and scholars within Industrial Networks Theory, and no deliberate attempt is made 
here to shed light on these matters. For the purpose of this paper, it is only assumed that relationship value is created when 
(actual or potential) relationship benefits are perceived to outweigh incurred sacrifices, whatever those two might be. 
Relationship value may be defined as the positive trade-off between relationship benefits and sacrifices (Ravald and 
Gronroos, 1996, Wilson and Jantrania, 1994). We are not here referring to the overall value of a business relationship (jointly 
created by, and somehow distributed between, both parties) (Wilson and Jantrania, 1994), but rather concerned with the 
‘slice’ of relationship value captured by the focal firm.   11
Expectations. Relationship benefits are greater and/or sacrifices lower than those expected by 
the focal firm (Anderson et al., 1994). The relationship value currently produced and seized is 
judged to exceed the focal firm’s expectations (based upon value creation, in the past, within 
similar business relationships). In addition to expectations drawing on past relationship value, 
one might further suggest that the focal firm’s future prospects (concerning potential 
relationship benefits and sacrifices) are likely to be important in the assessment of 
relationship significance. 
Hierarchies and markets. Benefits resulting from such alternative forms of governance 
(namely authority and price mechanism) are lower and/or sacrifices greater than those 
accruing from the focal firm’s business relationships (Biong et al., 1997, Walter and Ritter, 
2003). One can put this differently: for a similar set of benefits, the sacrifices stemming from 
business relationships are lower than those to be incurred in either hierarchies or markets (cf. 
Blois, 1999); or, we might add, for a similar set of sacrifices, benefits ensuing from business 
relationships are greater than those to be attained in hierarchies or markets. The relationship 
value created and captured exceeds the (potential) value that could be otherwise produced and 
appropriated by the focal firm had it (i) vertically integrating its counterpart (viz employing 
hierarchy), or (ii) be playing the market (i.e., keeping a counterpart at arm’s-length distance). 
Substitutable business relationships. Benefits stemming from a specific business 
relationship may be greater and/or sacrifices lower than those that might arise had the focal 
firm alternatively engaged in a business relationship with another counterpart (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995, Anderson et al., 1994, Wilson and Jantrania, 1994). That is, the value 
produced and appropriated by the focal firm in that business relationship outweighs the 
potential value accruing from engagement in substitutable business relationships. Disputably, 
the business relationship with a certain counterpart (e.g., customer A) may permit the focal 
firm to co-produce and appropriate more value than that arising in other business 
relationships, negatively connected or not (e.g., with customer B or supplier C respectively). 
This fact seems quite plausible, even though the value to be derived in these two last business 
relationships (with counterparts B and C) will be naturally different.
8 
Why we have set aside this comparative explanation. Focused only on the relative 
significance of business relationships (in comparison with the focal firm’s expectations or 
alternatives), this justification is consciously left out. Two reasons support our decision. 
                                                 
8 It seems to be implicitly assumed that substitutable business relationships are all about the focal firm’s mutually exclusive 
(i.e., negatively connected) relationships (Cook and Emerson, 1978). We think substitutable relationships may include also 
the complementary (i.e., positively connected) business relationships of the focal firm.   12
Firstly, think (abstractly) of ‘relationship benefits’ as ‘RB’, ‘relationship sacrifices’ as ‘RS’, 
‘benefits resulting from expectations or alternatives’ as ‘BEA’, and ‘sacrifices resulting from 
expectations or alternatives’ as ‘SEA’. Relationship significance is (partly) explained, 
according to the differential justification, because ‘RB exceeds BEA and/or SEA outweighs 
RS’. A problem arises as BEA and SEA cannot be (fully) determined without, first of all, 
thoroughly unravelling RB and RS. In particular, calculating the benefits and sacrifices (i) 
expected by the focal firm and (ii) ensuing from substitutable business relationships, it is a 
matter of taking (respectively) past and future perspectives on relationship value creation and 
appropriation. One needs to understand how relationship value is presently created and 
appropriated by the focal firm in order to (i) revise the relationship benefits and sacrifices 
earlier obtained in similar business relationships, and (ii) forecast the relationship benefits and 
sacrifices potentially attained in substitutable business relationships. Secondly, the benefits 
and sacrifices resulting from alternative governance structures (namely hierarchies and 
markets) are exhaustively detailed elsewhere, particularly in Transaction Cost Economics 
(Williamson, 1981) and the Property Rights Approach (Hart and Moore, 1990).
9 It is outside 
the scope of this paper to determine all the benefits and sacrifices of vertically integrating, and 
employing transactional relations with, counterparts. Incorporating the differential 
justification would thus substantially escalate the complexity of our discussion on relationship 
significance, possibly making our arguments unintelligible, and not contribute much to the 
overall purpose of this paper. 
Functions and dysfunctions in business relationships 
Relationship nature and role. Business relationships can be characterized according to two 
primary dimensions: nature (or substance) and role (or function) (cf. Hakansson and Snehota, 
                                                 
9 Our discussion of benefits and sacrifices accruing from hierarchies and markets is succinct and, of course, incomplete. It 
builds primarily upon the works of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985, 1981), and Grossman and Hart (1986). Transaction 
Cost Economics and the Property Rights Approach only refer to ‘costs’ (and not ‘sacrifices’) of hierarchies and markets. 
Nonetheless, as our conceptualization presumes the former to be part of the latter, no incoherence may be spotted here. The 
‘costs of using the price mechanism’ (i.e., ‘the costs of discovering what the relevant prices are’ and ‘the costs of negotiating, 
making, and concluding a separate contract for the supply of each article or service’) have been presciently discovered by 
Coase (1937, pp. 390-1), that claimed these costs to be the fundamental factor explaining the existence of the firm. Also 
labelled ‘marketing costs’ by Coase, they were later reworded ‘costs of transacting’ (Demsetz, 1968) and ‘transaction costs’ 
(Williamson, 1981). “The economic counterpart of friction is transaction cost: do the parties to the exchange operate 
harmoniously, or are there frequent misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns, and other 
malfunctions?” (Williamson, 1981, p. 552). In terms of benefits related to markets, the reduction of transaction costs (when 
asset specificity and uncertainty are both low and the exchange transaction is rather infrequent) is frequently stressed 
(Williamson, 1981). Benefits of vertically integrating often comprise: (i) provision of incentives alignment, hence mitigating 
hold-up problems (and other potential opportunistic behaviour); (ii) reduction of transaction costs (in the face of highly 
specific assets); and (iii) minimization of ex post losses related to ex ante investment distortions, because of contract 
incompleteness (Grossman and Hart, 1986). With respect to the sacrifices of hierarchies, one may point out: (i) diseconomies 
of scale and scope (or ‘diminishing returns to management’); (ii) internal governance costs (e.g., deriving from individuals 
pursuing their personal goals); and (iii) incentives impairment (mostly for the party acquired) and consequently monitoring 
costs (op. cit.).   13
1995). It is further argued that the latter is contingent upon the former (op. cit.). That is, some 
relationship substance – in the form of activity links, resource ties, and actor bonds - must 
exist if functions are to be performed. Relationship functions (and dysfunctions) are effected 
because the activities and resources of both parties to a business relationship are being 
coordinated and employed, respectively (Walter et al., 2001, Walter et al., 2003). 
In principle, only high-involvement (i.e., ‘substantial’) business relationships are certain to 
deliver functions for the focal firm (Gadde and Snehota, 2000); but that is not always the case, 
and therefore low-involvement (‘non-substantial’) relationships may also perform a role for 
the focal firm (for instance, in the future) (op. cit.).
10 Multiple features of business 
relationships (e.g., high degrees of trust, commitment, and interdependence, extended scope 
of cooperation and interpersonal contacts) are crucial to functions’ fulfilment. Unfortunately, 
some dysfunctions are unavoidable even with relationship substance. Empirical research has 
identified some relationship-specific factors as preconditions for functions’ fulfilment: (i) 
trust, commitment, and satisfaction (i.e., relationship quality); and (ii) adaptations (Walter and 
Ritter, 2003). In addition, Walter et al. (2003) empirically found that the fulfilment of (both 
direct and indirect) functions is a strong determinant for (perceived) relationship quality. A 
reciprocal, reinforcing effect between relationship function and quality thus seems to be 
posited. In this sense, it seems that the role of business relationships also shapes their nature 
(and not just the other way around). 
Relationship functions.  Both  primary and secondary functions are attributed to business 
relationships (Hakansson and Johanson, 1993a, cf. Anderson et al., 1994). Relationship 
functions are labelled primary, direct or first-order (when relationship benefits and sacrifices 
are immediate for the focal firm or ensue independently of its connected relationships); on the 
contrary, relationship functions are said secondary,  network,  indirect or second-order if 
benefits and sacrifices depend on the focal firm’s connected relationships or only accrue for it 
in the future (cf. Walter et al., 2001). “(…) in a given relationship, secondary functions can be 
as important as primary ones, or even more so” (Anderson et al., 1994, p. 3). 
Six main functions may be set forth to group the diversity of roles that business relationships 
play directly and indirectly for the focal firm (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson and Johanson, 
1992, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989): (1) access (to network actors, as well 
                                                 
10 Hakansson and Snehota (1995) argue that business relationships accomplish functions not only (i) for the dyad, and (ii) for 
each party involved, but also (iii) for third parties (i.e., rest of the network). Therefore, not only benefits and sacrifices stem 
for each and both parties involved (i.e., the focal firm and its counterpart), but also ensue for others (directly and indirectly) 
connected to them. The role played by business relationships for other (connected) network actors is acknowledged, but not 
important for the purpose of our paper – we will be hence focused on the relationship role for the focal firm.   14
as exploitation of their resources and activities); (2) control (i.e., exercise of influence, and 
increase of control or reduction of dependence, in the network); (3) efficiency (i.e., reduction 
of production and transaction costs); (4) innovation (i.e., creative leveraging of resource 
heterogeneity); (5) stability (i.e., learning and reduction of environmental uncertainty); and 
(6) strategy (i.e., interrelate with context, manage interdependences, and cope with network 
paradoxes).
11 These major functions are promptly described. 
(1) Access function. The focal firm is not a self-sufficient entity, being instead deeply 
enmeshed in networks of relationships and largely dependent on external resources and 
activities (Thompson, 1967). Focal firm’s resources and activities are therefore considered to 
extend beyond its traditional ownership delimited boundaries (Araujo and Easton, 1996). As 
suggested in the Activities-Resources-Actors (ARA) model (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 
1989, Hakansson and Johanson, 1992), business relationships allow the focal firm to access 
other network actors (namely firms) and exploit their (complementary) resources and 
activities. The resources possessed and the activities performed by the focal firm are a result 
of its history and can only be changed slowly and at great cost –at least this is a recurrent 
contention within the Resource-Based View of the Firm (RBV) (see, e.g., Dierickx and Cool, 
1989). However, the Industrial Networks Theory has shown that it is always possible (and 
less costly?) for the focal firm to change the resources and activities it has access to and 
exploits, by disentangling from existing business relationships and finding new partners (Ford 
et al., 1998). The resources and activities of the focal firm are essentially passive and 
fragmented. “A company is a collection of inert resources [and activities] that are only 
activated through interaction with others and (…) these resources [and activities] acquire their 
value when they become useful to others. Companies interact with each other and develop 
relationships in order to exploit and enhance their own resources [and activities] and to gain 
the benefit of those of others.” (Ford et al., 1998, p. 46, emphasis in original). Hence both 
(intra- and inter-firm) resource and activity complementarity is present in business markets 
(Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). 
(2) Control function. Business relationships can be used by the focal firm as means of 
influence over counterparts, thereby increasing its network control (Hakansson, 1987, 
Hakansson, 1989). Through business relationships, the focal firm can: (a) build new, or 
                                                 
11 Walter et al. (2003, 2001) list the (direct and indirect) functions of (i) supplier relationships for the customer and of (ii) 
customer relationships for the supplier, respectively. We believe all these functions, both direct and indirect ones (e.g., profit, 
market, to name but a few), may be easily marshalled in the six major functions imputed to business relationships (noted 
above), regardless of the focal firm being either a customer or supplier.   15
strengthen (i.e., preserve or alter) its existing, position(s) in the network (Mattsson and 
Johanson, 1992); (b) influence counterparts (and their respective network theories) and 
change business relationships, consequently altering network structures, e.g., by ending 
business relationships, establishing new, or changing the substance of existing ones (Mattsson 
and Johanson, 1992); (c) restructure the web of interdependences at the production system 
(i.e., activity/resource) level, e.g., to reduce its dependence on counterparts’ resources and 
activities, or increase counterparts’ dependence on own resources and activities (Mattsson and 
Johanson, 1992); (d) enhance its own reputation in the network or attractiveness as a business 
partner (Anderson et al., 1994); and (e) promote suitable change, or instead block undesired 
changes initiated elsewhere, e.g., by counterparts (Lundgren, 1992). 
(3) Efficiency function. “From the point of view of a company the benefits of relationships 
often consist in their positive consequences for company costs.” (Hakansson and Snehota, 
1995, p. 394). Efficiency gains (i.e., reducing production and transaction costs) can be 
achieved by the focal firm through participating in business relationships. By interlinking its 
activities with those of counterparts, the focal firm is likely to attain (more) efficient ways of 
producing and transacting (Hakansson, 1982). As Hakansson and Snehota (2000, p. 42) point 
out, “(…) relationships can be a way to reach a higher level of efficiency in the combination 
of production and transactions”. 
(4) Innovation function. According to the RBV, resource and competence development has 
been usually thought to occur within firms (cf. Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Conversely, such development has been empirically found to take place to a large extent 
between firms, i.e., in the business relationships they maintain among themselves (Hakansson 
and Snehota, 1995, Hakansson, 1987). “A firm’s capabilities and resources are seen as 
embodied in evolving networks of interdependence both within the firm and within the 
network structure in which it is embedded.” (Araujo and Easton, 1996, p. 376). As the focal 
firm combines its resources with those of counterparts, new knowledge is certain to emerge 
and hence previously unused dimensions of resources may be exploited (Penrose, 1959). 
Hakansson and Snehota (2000, p. 42) suggest that “(…) relationships can be means for tying 
resources to each other in such a way that some of their heterogeneity is utilized – that is, 
different dimensions of the resources are partly unknown, and through ‘interaction’ these 
dimensions are identified and utilized”. By interacting, new ways of employing and 
combining resources may be found (i.e., resource dimensions may be exploited differently or 
unknown dimensions discovered) and even new resources may be developed. “(…) it is   16
important that resources are not perceived as givens. Resources always have ‘hidden’ and 
unexploited dimensions that can be explored and developed in interaction with business 
partners. It is through the continuous combining and recombining in business relationships 
that new resource dimensions are identified and further developed.” (Gadde et al., 2003, p. 
360). Therefore, resource heterogeneity is the outcome of both internal operations and 
exchange processes taking place (Hakansson, 1987, Easton and Araujo, 1993, Penrose, 1959). 
(5)  Stability function. As business relationships develop over time, mutual trust and 
commitment are gradually increased, and interfirm learning becomes greater (Hakansson et 
al., 1999). Both learning and teaching happen in business relationships. Therefore, both 
parties’ uncertainties are likely to be greatly reduced (Easton, 1992). “Developing continuous, 
‘dense’ relationships with others seems to be a way to cope with the complexities and 
ambiguities which any company is facing in a [business] market.” (Hakansson and Snehota, 
1995, p. 11). Business relationships are used as information conduits or channels (Anderson et 
al., 1994, Hakansson, 1987), through which firms share their knowledge, hence allowing them 
to deal better with (and also increase their control over) the environmental complexity faced 
(Hakansson, 1982). Any business relationship always implies some degree of control of the 
focal firm over its counterpart (and vice versa) and therefore, some extent of control of the 
focal firm over its environment – stability is somewhat attained (Hakansson and Snehota, 
1989). 
(6) Strategy function. Business relationships influence, to larger or lesser degree, the focal 
firm’s strategy in the business markets in which it operates (Ford et al., 1998). The focal firm 
devises and puts in practice its strategy, with and mostly through the business relationships 
that it establishes, develops, maintains, and terminates with counterparts. “(…) strategy 
development in business markets centres on, is affected by, and is implemented through 
relationships” (op. cit., p. 75). Clearly, business relationships are one of the main instruments 
(if not the primary one) at the focal firm’s disposal to enact its network strategy. They 
contribute decisively to the way the focal firm: (i) relates to its changing context (Hakansson 
and Snehota, 1989); (ii) manages associated interdependences at activity, resource, and actor 
levels (Gadde et al., 2003); and (iii) deals with paradoxes inherent in business markets (e.g., 
influencing, and being influenced by, counterparts) (Hakansson and Ford, 2002). 
One final aspect is worthy of comment. Relationship functions may be fulfilled at activity, 
resource, or actor levels (cf. Anderson et al., 1994, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Put 
differently, the effects of relationship functions’ fulfilment (i.e., benefits) are sensed, by the   17
focal firm, to occur at these three levels. With respect to the six main functions of business 
relationships, they seem to be performed at diverse levels (see Table 1 below). Our viewpoint 
is that the Access, Control, and Strategy functions are fulfilled at all levels. With regard to 
Efficiency, Innovation, and Stability functions, these are respectively delivered at activity, 
resource, and actor levels. 
Main functions of business relationships   
Levels of 
fulfilment 
Access Control Efficiency  Innovation Stability  Strategy 
Activity          
Resource          
Actor            
Table 1 - Levels at which main relationship functions are fulfilled 
At a given point in time, not all these six functions are accomplished in every business 
relationship that the focal firm is engaged in (Walter et al., 2003). Moreover, the fulfilment of 
relationship functions is likely to vary over time. For example, as the focal firm’s relationship 
with customer A evolves, the Access function (previously accomplished in it) may be replaced 
by the Innovation function. If we presume that participation in business relationships can be 
often justified from diverse rationales
12, more than one function is bound to be fulfilled over 
time in each business relationship. Inasmuch as it is very unlikely that the same business 
relationship fulfils (at a certain point in time) all functions expected or desired by the focal 
firm (Walter et al., 2003), one might refer to the non-fulfilment of functions and consequently, 
to dysfunctions. 
Relationship dysfunctions. A business relationship may be labelled dysfunctional if it does 
not fulfil some functions (expected or desired from it by the focal firm) or if precludes the 
fulfilment of expected/desired functions in other (connected) relationships. For instance, the 
focal firm’s relationship with customer A is deemed dysfunctional if it does not permit the 
access to other relevant actors (i.e., does not fulfil the Access function) or hinders the 
Innovation function in its relationship with customer B. 
If some sacrifices (particularly deleterious outcomes) accrue to the focal firm, then a 
relationship dysfunction must have been performed. Furthermore, for each relationship 
function fulfilled for the focal firm, it is very likely that a dysfunction follows - and hence 
                                                 
12 We take advantage of this sound argument previously advanced by Barringer and Harrison (2000), who were however 
concerned with formal, horizontal interfirm relationships.   18
some deleterious outcomes result. For instance, as the focal firm obtains more control in the 
network (through fulfilment of the relationship Control function), there is a high likelihood 
that its counterparts also enhance their network control (partly at the expense of the focal 
firm). Or, as the focal firm copes better with the surrounding environmental complexity (via 
fulfilling the relationship Stability function), some of its own stability is necessarily lost (i.e., 
‘given’) to counterparts. The same happens for each other main function potentially carried 
out in that business relationship. In a certain sense, we may allude to six major dysfunctions 
potentially fulfilled by business relationships. The focal firm gains from being involved in 
business relationships, but in return it also has to cede (i.e., allowing or fostering its 
counterparts’ gains). In business markets, it is not a matter of receiving: one has forcefully to 
give, at least if it truly wants to get. This resembles Hakansson and Ford’s (2002) reasoning 
on the paradoxes inherent in business markets. 
Connectedness of relationship functions and dysfunctions. As business relationships are 
connected to each other, it is very likely that their functions and dysfunctions are 
interdependent (see Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). For instance, the Innovation function 
carried out in the focal firm’s relationship with customer A may be dependent on, as well as 
positively influence, the Innovation functions fulfilled in both the former’s relationship with 
customer B and the latter’s relationship with supplier C (a focal firm’s competitor). 
Alternatively, the mere existence of the (supposedly dysfunctional) business relationship with 
supplier D may preclude the realization of Innovation function in the focal firm’s relationship 
with supplier E. It does not seem necessary, however, that only functions and dysfunctions of 
the same kind are interdependent, as in the given examples. The same Innovation function of 
the focal firm’s relationship with A may (positively or otherwise) depend on, and impact, both 
the Access and Efficiency functions in its relationships with competitor C and supplier D 
respectively. 
Benefits and sacrifices resulting from being engaged in business relationships 
As mentioned earlier, relationship benefits are the positive outcomes deriving from the 
fulfilment of relationship functions. Relationship sacrifices, conversely, comprise the costs 
incurred to attain such benefits plus the negative outcomes stemming from either relationship 
dysfunctions or the mere non-fulfilment of relationship functions. Plainly, benefits encompass 
what propels the focal firm into business relationships, whilst sacrifices may be seen as the 
factors inhibiting relationship formation (Biong et al., 1997).   19
Relationship benefits. Six primary positive outcomes for the focal firm, accruing from 
fulfilling main relationship functions, may be advanced: (1) accessing other actors in the 
network, and potentially exploiting their resources and activities (complementary to those it 
internally possesses and performs) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, Johanson and Mattsson, 
1987, Hakansson, 1989, Hakansson, 1982); (2) exercising and/or augmenting its influence 
and control in the network (e.g., reinforcing its network position, changing the dominant 
network theory, restructuring interdependences at activity and resource levels to its own 
advantage, enhancing its reputation and attractiveness, promoting or blocking change) 
(Hakansson and Johanson, 1992, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987, Anderson et al., 1994); (3) 
attaining efficiency gains (i.e., reducing its production and transaction costs) (Hakansson, 
1982, Hakansson, 1989, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987); (4) innovating (i.e., improving the 
existing use of resources, discovering new uses for extant resources, or even developing new 
resources) (Anderson et al., 1994); (5) learning, thus coping better with (or even reducing) the 
surrounding environmental uncertainty (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989, Hakansson, 
1982); and (6) strategizing (i.e., devising and putting into practice its network strategy) 
(Gadde et al., 2003, Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). 
Relationship sacrifices (costs plus deleterious outcomes). Three relationship costs are 
usually faced by the focal firm: (1) opportunity costs related to its established business 
relationships
13 (in particular the adaptations made in them)
14 (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, 
Hakansson, 1982); (2) relationship handling costs (i.e., costs of establishing, developing, 
maintaining, and terminating each of its business relationships)
15 (Hakansson and Snehota, 
                                                 
13 The focal firm’s current relationships, at a given point in time, may contribute to forfeit future gains ensuing from more 
attractive relationships that exist or may eventually come up (Biong et al., 1997). As an illustrative example, the focal firm’s 
relationship with customer A may (i) preclude the obtainment of benefits in new, potentially more valuable business 
relationships (with counterparts B and C, which are both A’s competitors) or (ii) hinder the attainment of more benefits 
and/or less sacrifices in its concurrent relationship with Supplier D. 
14 Adaptations may be envisaged as idiosyncratic (relationship-specific) investments indispensable to the development 
process of business relationships (Ford, 1980, Dwyer et al., 1987). As adaptations often cannot be transferred to other 
business relationships (hence having insignificant or zero value in alternative uses), they are certain to involve opportunity 
costs (cf. Hallen et al., 1991). Relationship adaptations compete for the limited resources of the focal firm (Ford et al., 1998). 
Moreover, focal firm’s adaptation in one of its business relationship may imply ‘misadaptation’ in another (Ritter, 1999).  
15 For Blois (1999), three relationship costs are generally incurred by the focal firm: (i) costs for establishing the business 
relationship (what he calls ‘investment’); (ii) costs for developing the business relationship (so-called ‘relationship 
development costs’); and (iii) costs for maintaining the business relationship (labelled ‘relationship maintenance costs’). In 
addition, the focal firm’s costs involved in ending its business relationships must also be considered. Inasmuch as business 
relationships are substantial (i.e., have substance), costs for terminating or exiting them are not negligible (Ford et al., 1998). 
Business relationships “(…) are not easy to change quickly and changes are likely to incur significant costs, both in 
disruption and in developing new relationships” (op. cit., p. 43). These last costs are not given proper attention by Industrial 
Networks Theory, probably because they do not lead to any relationship benefits - at least immediately or within the business 
relationship in question. We believe they should nonetheless be included in this relationship cost category. In essence, 
relationship handling costs comprise all focal firm’s expenses necessary to initiate, nurture, sustain, and exit business 
relationships with counterparts (e.g., the time spent in negotiations, adaptations made). These expenses, often large and 
difficult to overall quantify, are partly considered sunk costs for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Relationship 
handling costs can notwithstanding be easily imputed to a single counterpart or to a specific business relationship (op. cit.).   20
1995, Blois, 1999, Gadde and Snehota, 2000); and (3) network handling costs (i.e., overhead 
costs incurred with several of its business relationships)
16 (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, 
Gadde and Snehota, 2000). 
With respect to deleterious outcomes accruing to the focal firm because of its engagement in 
business relationships, one may point out: (1) lock-in effects (e.g., focal firm’s established 
business relationships may preclude the development of other relationships)
17 (Mota and 
Castro, 2002, Araujo and Harrison, 2002); (2) being more subject to opportunistic behaviour 
of counterparts (e.g., free-riding and hold-up problems), in parallel with its growing 
dependency on counterparts (and the resulting loss of autonomy) (Hakansson, 1982, Biong et 
al., 1997); and (3) various others harmful consequences (e.g., the focal firm’s relationship 
with counterpart A may have damaging effects on its positions, reputation, and attractiveness 
in the network) (Anderson et al., 1994, Mattsson, 1989). Additionally, deleterious outcomes 
may include the non-attainment of positive relationship outcomes by the focal firm, i.e., what 
it could have gained (more?) in its business relationships. (Deleterious outcomes may hence 
come close to relationship opportunity costs.) Therefore, deleterious outcomes may be partly 
seen as relationship benefits obtained by counterparts, at the expense of the focal firm. For 
example, Efficiency and Innovation benefits captured by counterpart A (to the disfavour of the 
focal firm) can be viewed, from the focal firm’s perspective, as relationship sacrifices (namely 
deleterious outcomes). 
Interdependence of relationship benefits and sacrifices. Diverse benefits and sacrifices are 
typically expected from different business relationships. As stressed earlier, benefits and 
sacrifices depend on the substance (and quality) of the business relationship (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995), which in turn is contingent upon the posture adopted by, and consequently 
the input of, both parties to it (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). Different relationship postures (i.e., 
degrees of involvement) are sure to be conducive to diverse benefits and sacrifices. 
                                                 
16 Both the production, warehousing, and distribution costs of a focal firm’s product sold to customers, and the costs 
associated with the technological platform used for communicating with its suppliers (e.g., internet, phone, fax) are two 
examples of costs which cannot be attributed to a particular business relationship or counterpart - they are entitled 
relationship base costs by Hakansson and Snehota (1995). Gadde and Snehota (2000), on the other hand, label the focal 
firm’s overhead costs in dealing with suppliers as supply handling costs. Drawing upon their rationale, we coin the notion of 
network handling costs to refer to the common (shared) costs incurred by the focal firm to interact with (some of) its multiple 
counterparts. 
17 “By engaging in a relationship some companies perceive that they might loose flexibility in choosing alternative partners 
(…)” (Biong et al., 1997, p. 102, emphasis added). Put simply, lock-in effects can be embodied into loss of flexibility or 
alternatively, the costs of change (Ford et al., 1998). Lock-in effects are associated to “(…) the notion that ‘history matters’ in 
the way we understand the trajectories of firms and the technological choices they are confronted with” (Araujo and 
Harrison, 2002, p. 5). Over time, the focal firm’s trajectory in business markets is strongly determined by its (past, current, 
and future) business relationships with counterparts (Mota and Castro, forthcoming).   21
Relationship benefits and sacrifices are not independent (Gadde and Snehota, 2000); the 
former are not derived automatically or for free (op. cit.), being partly dependent on the latter 
(Blois, 1999). Some time and sacrifices (at least costs) are needed, before relationship benefits 
can be reaped by the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Blois, 1999). Attaining 
benefits often requires a high-involvement of the focal firm in the business relationship, i.e., 
sacrifices. It is not axiomatic, however, that only high-involvement business relationships lead 
to significant benefits and entail low sacrifices (e.g., the case in which the counterpart lacks 
motivation and interest) (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). On the other hand, a low-involvement 
business relationship may permit the focal firm to attain high benefits, while incurring only 
reduced sacrifices (op. cit.). Finally, it should be noted that different amounts of sacrifices 
may lead to similar relationship benefits whilst similar relationship sacrifices may imply 
diverse benefits (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). 
Measuring relationship benefits and sacrifices. There will always remain some uncertainty 
about the overall sacrifices and benefits accruing from a business relationship (Ford, 1980) 
and not all of these can be quantitatively calculated. “Some [relationship] consequences are 
quite easy to exposure, measure and quantity; others are less obvious, more indirect and more 
difficult to measure, but no less important.” (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, p. 307). As a rule, the 
former consequences are relationship sacrifices whereas the latter refer to relationship 
benefits. 
In the short-term, relationship benefits are only partially evident for both the focal firm and its 
counterpart, becoming more manifest over time and indirectly (i.e., in the future and in 
connected relationships respectively) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Gadde and Snehota, 
2000). Owing to being more immediate and direct, relationship sacrifices are easier to assess. 
Plus, because benefits are mostly non-economic (intangible) and sacrifices are generally 
expressed in economic terms (tangible), it becomes much more difficult to compute the 
former than the latter (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). Lastly, relationship benefits and sacrifices 
are both firm-specific, i.e., they vary across the parties to a business relationship (Hakansson 
and Snehota, 1995). That is, a business relationship may bear more benefits (or sacrifices) for 
the focal firm than for its counterpart, or vice-versa. (This explains the difference in 
perceptions of the focal firm and its counterpart regarding the significance of their business 
relationship, as will be discussed below. See footnote 18.) 
Relationship benefits and sacrifices: which to emphasize? Relationship benefits and 
sacrifices are two sides of the same coin (Hakansson and Snehota, 2000). Industrial Networks   22
Theory, however, seems to place more emphasis on the benefits than on the sacrifices ensuing 
from business relationships. Both economic outcomes (mostly benefits) ensuing from, and the 
functions fulfilled by, business relationships are largely addressed in Industrial Networks 
Theory. By contrast, non-economic consequences as well as relationship sacrifices and 
dysfunctions are, almost in the same proportion, overlooked (Walter et al., 2001). This 
reinforces the widespread notion that the benefit side of business relationships is more 
important than their sacrifice side (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). 
Industrial Networks Theory does not give too much importance to the deleterious outcomes 
potentially ensuing from being engaged in business relationships (e.g., dependency and 
opportunistic behaviour problems). Probably, this is because potential deleterious outcomes 
are ‘part of the game’ – exactly what Hakansson and Ford’s (2002) reasoning on network 
paradoxes suggest. The focal firm should hence be more concerned with relationship benefits 
rather than with their accruing sacrifices. Hakansson and Snehota (1995, p. 396) convey this 
in clear terms: “(…) economizing on the costs of handling relationships is important but 
exploiting the potential relationship benefits is even more important. It is the benefits side of 
relationships and not the costs [and overall sacrifices] they entail that appear to be the critical 
variable in a management perspective”. 
Perceptual nature of relationship significance 
Before advancing to the gist of our paper, a few remarks ought to be made. As stressed 
earlier, the significance of business relationships for the focal firm can be directly traced to 
their outcomes – in general, ensuing benefits exceed sacrifices (i.e., relationship value is 
created and appropriated by the focal firm). Some of these relationship outcomes - primarily 
the benefits and sacrifices which are non-economic, mediate, and indirect - are difficult, if not 
impossible, to quantify or measure fairly. At most, they can be (subjectively) assessed by the 
focal firm (and, conversely, by its counterparts). Even if relationship benefits and sacrifices 
were totally quantifiable, the biased character of the individual actors (within the focal firm 
and counterparts) assessing them would have, as a consequence, personal (and different) 
valuations (Blois, 1999). By virtue of the intangible nature of benefits and sacrifices, the 
significance of business relationships is only perceived by the focal firm (and counterparts), 
instead of objectively determined. Business relationships are perceived to be more or less, or 
not at all, significant for the focal firm. At a given point in time, two business relationships 
cannot be equally significant – a relationship significance continuum may be thus presumed 
(Sousa and Castro, 2004b, Sousa and Castro, 2004a). Relationship significance is essentially a   23
perception of the focal firm, usually of its top management and other personnel directly 
involved in managing them (e.g., from marketing and purchasing departments). This 
perception is likely to vary over time, not only among the parties to a business relationship
18, 
but also within each party involved. In this respect, the time-varying significance of business 
relationships for the focal firm can be contended (Sousa and Castro, 2004b, Sousa and Castro, 
2004a). 
The final point to stress is that connectedness needs to be taken into account when assessing 
the significance of business relationships for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). 
Seemingly, the significance of a focal firm’s specific relationship is often related to the 
significance of its other (directly or indirectly connected) business relationships. For example, 
the benefits (resulting from functions’ fulfilment) in excess of sacrifices (accruing either from 
dysfunctions’ fulfilment, non-fulfilment of functions, or both) attained by the focal firm in its 
business relationship with customer A may be strongly associated with the benefits and 
sacrifices derived (and hence to the functions and dysfunctions performed) in its connected 
relationships with other counterparts (e.g., customer B and supplier C). 
A MINOR FLAW IN A MAJOR PROPOSITION? 
We can now state explicitly the relationship significance proposition of Industrial Networks 
Theory: 
A business relationship may be considered significant for the focal firm to the extent 
that ensuing benefits are perceived to exceed sacrifices (i.e., relationship value is 
created and appropriated). 
According to the above-mentioned rationale, one all-encompassing argument is (implicitly) 
advanced within Industrial Networks Theory to support the significance proposition: the 
creation and appropriation of relationship value. That is, the relationship value created and 
captured by the focal firm - in the form of (i) access to network actors, and exploitation of 
their resources and activities; (ii) exercise or increase of influence and control in the network; 
(iii) efficiency gains; (iv) innovation; (v) learning and reduced environmental uncertainty; or 
(vi) network strategy - is claimed sine qua non for relationship significance. To our 
viewpoint, however, this argument sets a minimum, i.e., is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for advocating relationship significance. As an illustrative example, one may think 
                                                 
18 The same business relationship may be differently perceived as significant by the parties involved. For instance, the focal 
firm may perceive the business relationship as highly significant, whilst the counterpart may only sense it as low in 
significance. Theoretically, a certain business relationship may be considered more significant for one party than for the 
other. We think this is not unusual.   24
of a business relationship that the focal firm holds with counterpart A (one of its suppliers). 
Such business relationship may be perceived as significant by the focal firm even though 
accruing sacrifices far exceed attained benefits (i.e., relationship value, if co-produced, is only 
appropriated by A). In this situation, the focal firm’s perception of significance concerning its 
business relationship with A will probably be motivated by other (yet unknown) motives. 
The dominant theoretical justification underlying the relationship significance proposition is 
externally (or interfirm) oriented, essentially focused towards the focal firm’s (interaction 
with its) context (see, e.g., Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). Another part of the ‘relationship 
significance’ picture seems to be neglected by Industrial Networks Theory. An internally-
oriented (intrafirm) theoretical support, primarily addressing the core of the focal firm, may 
be missing. Adopting a competence or knowledge-based perspective on the focal firm - hence 
looking at it as a bundle of resources and competences (Penrose, 1959, Kogut and Zander, 
1992) - may be illuminating. We posit that the conceptual ‘baggage’ of so-called Knowledge-
Based Theories of the Firm (e.g., the notions of routines, dynamic capabilities, and 
competences) may help to explain relationship significance, hence complementing the 
network-based explanations on this matter. 
Cross-fertilizing network- and knowledge-based perspectives? 
Industrial Networks and Knowledge-Based Theories have divergent concerns, naturally 
differing in their main units of analysis (which are focal firm’s networks of business 
relationships and its resources and competences, respectively). Plainly, one may argue that the 
former theory is more focused on the outside of the focal firm (addressing the character and 
dynamics of business networks surrounding the focal firm), whilst the latter is chiefly 
concerned with its innermost parts (specifically its resource endowments). These two theories 
may be thus seen, in principle, as complementary to each other. 
Traditionally, Knowledge-Based Theories have been depicted as strongly influenced by 
neoclassical economics (Foss, 1997) and building upon unrealistic premises (when compared 
to the ones of Industrial Networks Theory) regarding the firm in general, and its environment, 
resources, and strategy in particular. The following orthodox assumptions can be easily 
summarized: (i) firms are seen as isolated and completely independent entities (hence 
neglecting business relationships and only acknowledging atomistic, faceless, and fully 
hostile environment); (ii) resources are only seen to reside within the firm (ignoring or 
downplaying the importance of external resources, and overlooking both intrafirm and   25
interfirm resource complementarities); and (iii) strategy is taken as a totally competitive, zero-
sum game (Lavie, forthcoming, Foss, 1997). Consider, in contrast, the network-based 
allegations of: (i) firms as interdependent actors, deeply enmeshed in a full-face, networked 
environment; (ii) resources extending beyond firm boundaries; and (iii) relational strategy 
built around ‘making together’ with counterparts (Araujo and Easton, 1996, Ford et al., 1998). 
In the face of such opposing premises, a potential incompatibility between network- and 
knowledge-based perspectives may be at stake (Sousa and Castro, 2004a, Sousa and Castro, 
2004b). 
The intellectual bridge between these two theories has been attempted (if not de facto made) 
by Loasby (1998). Bridging the insights of Penrose (1959) and Richardson (1972), thus 
harmonizing knowledge- and network-based rationales, Loasby (op. cit.) postulates the focal 
firm as a set of internal (direct and indirect) competences, profoundly embedded in a wider 
network of external (direct and indirect) competences.
19 Firms have necessarily limited direct 
competences (i.e., know how to do some things) and, consequently, need to possess indirect 
competences (i.e., know how to get certain things done by others). In this sense, engaging in, 
nurturing and maintaining business relationships to access and exploit needed (external) 
competences is fundamental for the focal firm. In a similar vein, Sousa and Castro (2004a) 
contend that the theoretical cross-fertilization between network- and knowledge-based 
perspectives is not only apposite, but can also be conceptually advantageous for both. In a 
preliminary review of Knowledge-Based Theories, they propose a (yet incipient) conceptual 
framework that allegedly overcomes the main pitfalls attributed to such theories - principally 
their conventional unworkable assumptions (described above), and the terminological 
ambiguity and conceptual tangle frequently observed within those (cf. Foss, 1997). 
Changing the whys in Industrial Networks Theory 
Presumably, the significance of business relationships for the focal firm cannot be sufficiently 
explained by the current state-of-art of Industrial Networks Theory. Therefore, the main 
objective of this paper is to challenge the robustness of the relationship significance 
proposition, or in other words, the completeness of its underlying arguments. It seems 
                                                 
19 Some competences are internal (existing within the focal firm), whereas others are external (complementary, residing 
outside the focal firm) (Richardson, 1972). Internal competences may be of two types: (i) direct competences, also labelled as 
core (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), and (ii) indirect ones, said ancillary (Langlois and Robertson, 1995), relational (Lorenzoni 
and Lipparini, 1999) or network (Ritter, 1999). Both internal and external competences may be envisaged as knowledge 
assets (Richardson, 1972, Winter, 1987), primarily intangible (tacit, difficult to codify), and rooted in the focal firm’s ‘way of 
doing things’ (i.e., organizational routines composed of complexly interconnected individual skills) (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Such idiosyncratic competences (Barney, 1991, Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) cannot be purchased on factor markets, 
being rather internally developed (Penrose, 1959, Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Teece et al., 1997).   26
apposite to state hereinto that we are not interested in questioning the significance proposition 
in itself, as we unequivocally agree with business relationships being in general significant for 
the focal firm (by virtue of the aforementioned benefits in excess of sacrifices, and hence 
relationship value, they allow it to create and appropriate). Furthermore, our intent is neither 
to question nor evaluate Industrial Networks Theory as a whole.
20 Instead we are only 
modestly trying to advance suggestions in order to improve (extend) theory (cf. Van de Ven, 
1989, Whetten, 1989). 
So far, we have intuitively pinpointed a minor flaw in one of Industrial Networks Theory’s 
major propositions. To solve such theoretical pitfall, the falsifiability of the significance 
proposition needs to be tested (cf. Bacharach, 1989). We must start from the premise that: (i) 
the  antecedent of the significance proposition (‘creation and appropriation of relationship 
value by the focal firm’) is only a necessary condition for the consequent (‘relationship 
significance’); and (ii) the referred proposition is non-tautological (i.e., the sheer existence of 
the antecedent does not automatically imply the existence of the consequent) (cf. Bacharach, 
1989). Put simply, one needs to search for (or discover) empirical cases in which business 
relationships are perceived as significant by the focal firm and, more importantly, such 
relationship significance is not justified by the arguments previously advanced within 
Industrial Networks Theory (namely creation and appropriation of relationship value). Our 
conjecture is that such empirical research will probably unearth knowledge-based reasons for 
the relationship significance. 
Competences (and boundaries): an emerging explanation for relationship significance 
Sousa and Castro (2004b) presume the focal firm (i) to comprise a bundle of internal 
competences, assets, and dynamic capabilities, whilst (ii) being deeply embroiled in its 
environment (hence relying, via business relationships, on external competences and 
resources) (cf. Barney, 1986, Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Teece et al., 1997, Langlois and 
Robertson, 1995). By looking at their knowledge-based framework (op. cit., p. 15), two sound 
questions crop up: 
1.  Do the focal firm’s business relationships contribute to the development, maintenance, 
and upgrading of its internal competences and assets? 
                                                 
20 Evaluating a theory can proceed in one of two ways: (1) determine if it exhibits accuracy, generality, and simplicity 
(Weick, 1969) or reasonably balances comprehensiveness and parsimony (Whetten, 1989); and (2) assess if it is both 
falsifiable and useful (i.e., can be disproved and is able to explain and predict respectively) (Bacharach, 1989).   27
2.  Do the focal firm’s business relationships contribute to the access and exploitation 
(and possibly the creation) of required external competences and resources?
21 
Industrial Networks Theory recurrently advocates, with our total agreement, that all external 
resources and competences accessed and exploited by the focal firm are inextricably related to 
its (potential and actual) business relationships, i.e., the business relationships it is capable of 
(and  de facto chooses to) establish, develop, and sustain with several counterparts 
(Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989). In a knowledge-based terminology (Nelson and Winter, 
1982, Loasby, 1998), what the focal firm gets done by others (Nelson and Winter, 1982, cf. 
Loasby, 1998)  thus seems to be (in part) positively influenced by its current business 
relationships.
22 (Moreover, the focal firm also gets things done via arm’s-length relations with 
counterparts. The resources and competences subcontracted by the focal firm across the 
market (i.e., accessed via transactional relations) are themselves likely to be a consequence of 
what it is unable of, or rather chooses not to, access and exploit through business 
relationships.) On the other hand, we contend the following: what the focal firm does 
competently within and across its boundaries (i.e., its core and relational  or  network 
competences) (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, Ritter, 1999, Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) is 
bound to reflect the external resources and competences it is incapable of, or (even if able) 
chooses not to, access and exploit through business relationships. 
If the answer to both questions set forth above is (as we believe) a ‘yes’, then relationship 
significance is strongly associated with (i) what the focal firm does (competently) by itself 
and (ii) what it gets done (competently) by others, particularly via business relationships. In 
short, relationship significance may be justified by the influence that business relationships 
have on defining over time the boundaries of the focal firm. Basically, these boundaries 
separate what the focal firm does from what it gets done by others (via business relationships, 
as well through purely transactional relations, with counterparts). The delimitation of focal 
firm’s fuzzy boundaries is hence not resumed to a series of discrete ‘make-or-buy’ decisions. 
Yet usually seen as both independent and dichotomous (Williamson, 1975), such decisions 
are connected to each other and, more importantly, incorporate a third option (‘access’). 
                                                 
21 This question is clearly one put forward (and positively answered) by Industrial Networks Theory, in particular its ARA 
Model (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989, Hakansson and Johanson, 1992). 
22 The (partial) influence of business relationships on what the focal firm gets done by others is somehow already 
incorporated in the ‘creation and appropriation of relationship value’ argument – advanced by Industrial Networks Theory to 
explain relationship significance - under the guise of ‘access to, and exploitation of, external resources and activities’ (the 
Access function earlier seen). We thank Lars Mikkelsen and Professor Hakan Hakansson for pointing this out.   28
Boundary decisions are hence about making (vertically integrating), buying (through arm’s-
length relations), or accessing (via business relationships). 
In addition to network-based reasoning alluded to before (to wit, creation and appropriation 
of relationship value by the focal firm), the significance proposition of Industrial Networks 
Theory may be supported by the influence that business relationships play on the evolution of 
the blurring and changeable boundaries of the focal firm, i.e., on what it competently does 
and gets done (cf. Araujo et al., 2003, Mota and Castro, 2004). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Arguably, the Industrial Networks Theory does not stake out the sufficient conditions 
supporting its relationship significance proposition. The creation and appropriation of 
relationship value by the focal firm seems but a necessary condition for the significance of 
business relationships. This is because the justification is naturally focused on the focal firm’s 
outside (in particular its context) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989), and consequently only on 
what it gets done by others (Hakansson and Johanson, 1992). Understandably, the network-
based arguments underlying relationship significance do not contemplate the (partly 
overlooked) inside of the focal firm, in particular what it competently does within and across 
boundaries (i.e., core and relational competences). Questioning the robustness of the 
significance proposition implies that one must search for unexplored empirical evidences (or 
discover already documented ones) wherein the significance of business relationships for the 
focal firm is justified by reasons other than the network-based exposed before. Only 
forthcoming empirical research can illuminate these matters, and corroborate our criticisms on 
Industrial Networks Theory.
23 
We conjecture that the network-based reasoning on the significance proposition may be 
supplemented with a rationale borrowed from Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992). The knowledge-based perspective may shed some light on relationship 
significance, despite its conventional premises being in some respects contradictory to the 
ones of Industrial Networks Theory (e.g., the knowledge view of the focal firm as an 
atomistic entity in a faceless, fully hostile environment). Researchers and scholars are trained 
to tenaciously pursue consistency in their theories, while dismissing any theoretical tensions 
and contradictions (like the potential ones arising when one attempts the cross-fertilization of 
                                                 
23 Of course, disclosed empirical cases - wherein ‘relationship significance’ (consequent) is not preceded by ‘creation and 
appropriation of relationship value by the focal firm’ (antecedent) - can be searched for within the literatures on Industrial 
Networks and Knowledge-based Theories of the Firm. If a future quick trawl through such literatures yields no satisfactory 
results, our intention is to conduct own inquiry.   29
network- and knowledge-based views). The possibility to exploit theoretical paradoxes in 
their efforts to advance theories is often neglected by theorists (Poole and Van de Ven, 
1989).
24 
Reality is variegated – hence theories describe, explain, and predict, yet can only give partial 
pictures of it. “In this view, theories are not statements of some ultimate ‘truth’ but rather are 
alternative cuts of a multifaceted reality” (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989, p. 563). Researchers 
and scholars are trained and schooled in their theories for years (Van de Ven, 1989). As 
impelled to continually focus on (and perfect) theory, their field of vision is narrowed and an 
inability to reconsider and question presumptions is bound to develop among them. 
Conversely, instead of regarding theory as ‘a self-encapsulating whole’, researchers and 
scholars can play theories (even if incompatible) against one another, thus gaining insights 
from diverse perspectives (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). “Questions problematic for one 
theory can often be addressed by another. Insights gained from one [theoretical] position 
should supplement and balance those from others” (op. cit., pp. 569-70). Along this vein, the 
reasoning that “(…) seemingly opposed viewpoints can inform one another (…)” (op. cit., p. 
566) is here espoused seriously. 
Even if apparently antagonistic, we believe network- and knowledge-based perspectives can 
be properly (and profitably) cross-fertilized. Three motives give further strength to their 
theoretical cross-fertilization. Firstly, the genesis of Industrial Networks Theory is in part 
related to bringing together different, partly contrasting theories (e.g., resource dependence, 
social exchange, transaction cost, and relational contracting theories) (Wilkinson, 2001, 
Easton, 1992). Secondly, Industrial Networks Theory is itself somewhat paradoxical, 
simultaneously incorporating conflicting notions of competition and cooperation, or stability 
and change within business relationships, just to cite two prominent examples. Finally, as one 
makes deeper sense of the large and heterogeneous knowledge-based literature, the 
incompatibility with the network view seems easily overcomed (see, for instance, Sousa and 
Castro, 2004a). 
Not addressing a triviality, just attempting the improvement of theory 
The endless quest for better theory is a basic instinct in every researcher and scholar, 
whatever their field of study is (Van de Ven, 1989). Instead of being merely theory users, 
                                                 
24 It should be acknowledged that Industrial Networks and Knowledge-based theories do not provide mutually exclusive 
explanations of a given phenomenon, and hence the theoretical paradox - as Poole and Van de Ven (1989, p. 564) 
characterize it – is not here absolutely featured.   30
researchers and scholars should assume the key role of theory developers. In this respect, the 
current state-of-art of any theory should always be challenged, rather than simply (re)asserted 
(cf. Whetten, 1989). We think Industrial Networks’ theorists implicitly share this standpoint. 
This is understandable, insofar as the own birth of Industrial Networks Theory was motivated 
by questioning taken-for-granted assumptions in the industrial marketing field (strongly 
rooted in economics) (Cunningham, 1980). Professor Hakan Hakansson, one of the founders 
and the most prominent fledge-bearers of Industrial Networks Theory, has vigorously 
contended: “As researchers, we need to believe that we can be wrong. (…) Challenging, 
instead of accepting, can be an enthusiastic route. It makes you move on (…)”.
25 And this is 
exactly what we are doing here. 
We believe relationship significance to be a prominent (but somewhat overlooked) topic 
within Industrial Networks Theory. It is quite admissible that relationship significance is 
(unanimously?) considered a triviality - it certainly is an inescapable stepping stone for many 
(if not all) of us who see reality in ‘relationship’ and ‘network’ terms (within the IMP Group 
or not). What we find totally inadequate is the prevalent view that underlying explanations for 
relationship significance are also trivial. They are not, and cannot be seen as such. This 
modest essay pretends to be a starting point for the indispensable (yet missing) reflection on 
this issue. It does not offer a definitive answer to the question put forward in the title, but 
nonetheless advances a tentative and workable path for obtaining such answer. Proposing 
solutions is an inherent responsibility of those who raise criticisms to theory (Whetten, 1989). 
Like many other researchers, our ultimate objective is to contribute for an even better Theory 
of Industrial Networks. 
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